Is a Parent Company Liable for Its Wholly Owned Subsidiary
The parent company is usually a large company that often has control of more than one subsidiary. Parent companies may be more or less active in relation to their subsidiaries, but they still hold a majority stake to some extent. The level of control exercised by the parent company generally depends on the level of control that the parent company assigns to the directors of the subsidiary. In addition, a parent company often appoints its employees as directors of a subsidiary. Directors of wholly-owned subsidiaries could take a flexible approach to the performance of their duties, given that the parent company is the sole shareholder of the subsidiary. There are ways for the parent company to maintain strict control without violating the independence of the subsidiary. The power to put and pull on the board is crucial, but it can be strengthened. For example, in the case of a new subsidiary, the parent company as owner may draft the articles of association, including some provisions to consolidate control: Like organic parent companies, the parent company has a lot of control and a lot of influence over its subsidiary (or company – a large company can have many subsidiaries). However, the subsidiary must maintain a legally independent existence. Another advantage of wholly-owned subsidiaries is the potential to coordinate a global corporate strategy. A parent company typically selects companies that become wholly-owned subsidiaries that it considers essential to its overall success as a business.
Despite the Group`s influence, the subsidiaries remain independent. They are still responsible for managing the day-to-day operations of the company and decisions that affect the subsidiary and not the parent company. Under Australian law, a parent company may be considered a fictitious director of a subsidiary if it appoints its officers to the board of directors of the subsidiary and expects those officers to exercise their powers in accordance with the instructions or wishes of the parent company. One of the reasons why companies set up subsidiaries is to protect themselves legally. If the subsidiary remains independent, the parent company is not liable for the negligence or criminal acts of the subsidiary. However, the law provides for exceptions: as a threshold, a plaintiff must therefore prove that the court has personal jurisdiction to exercise control over the parent company. In order to establish a primary agency relationship sufficient for the exercise of the personal jurisdiction of a court, the plaintiff must sufficiently assert that the foreign defendants intentionally exercised the benefits of doing business in the Federal Forum and that the foreign subsidiary acted with the knowledge, consent, or complete control of the U.S. parent company.15 The relationship between a corporation and its subsidiary affiliate depends on certain Important conditions: the court also found that the plaintiff`s claim to pierce the corporate veil was insufficient. The court noted that “when TPR Holdings exercised full control over the defendants, the plaintiff did not claim that the abuse of the company`s form was intended to defraud the plaintiff and cause damage.” Id. The court stated that “the plaintiff did not claim that the defendant daughters were not legitimate corporations or that they were formed for an improper purpose to prevent the plaintiff from recovering the contract, or that the company`s funds were intentionally misappropriated to prove one of the three companies.” Id.
(citing Tap Holdings, LLC v. Orix Fin. Corp., 109 A.D.3d 167, 174-177 (1st Department 2013); Fantazia Corp International Airport.c.CPL Furs N.Y., Inc., 67 A.D.3d 511, 512 (1st department 2009)). The mere assertion that “TPR Holdings caused the defendants to break a contract,” the court concluded, was “not sufficient to prove the necessary wrongdoing.” Id. at *1-*2 (based on Skanska USA Bldg. Inc. v. Atlantic Yards B2 Owner, LLC, 146 A.D.3d 1, 12 (1st Dept. 2016), aff`d, 31 N.Y.3d 1002 (2018)). Under New York law (and elsewhere), a parent company can be held liable for the actions of its subsidiaries if “the alleged injustice appears to be traceable to the parent company by the management of its own staff and management” and the parent company has interfered in the operations of the subsidiaries in a manner that exceeds a parent company`s control as an ownership incident. See e.B. United States v.
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 64 (1998) (citation omitted). As the Court held in the World Wide Packaging case, there was no allegation or evidence that TPR had interfered in the actions of its subsidiaries. In summary, plaintiffs have a number of hurdles to overcome in order to hold a parent company liable for the shares of a foreign subsidiary or to join a foreign subsidiary in a U.S. court case. U.S. parent companies can protect themselves by ensuring that they do not establish the required agency or alter-ego relationship with the foreign subsidiary. A subsidiary is considered a wholly-owned company if another company, the parent company, holds all the common shares. The shares of the subsidiary are not listed on the stock exchange.
But it remains an independent legal entity, a body with its own organized framework and administration. However, day-to-day operations are likely to be fully managed by the parent company. This means that if the directors of a wholly-owned subsidiary are accustomed to acting on the instructions of the parent company, the parent company can be considered a “fictitious director” of the subsidiary and has essentially the same obligations and responsibilities as a director of the subsidiary, including liability for insolvent trading. The corporate veil is violated (1) to obtain justice, even without fraud, when the officers and employees of a parent company exercise control over the day-to-day operations of a subsidiary and act as the real main actors behind the actions of the subsidiary, and/or (2) when a parent company carries out activities through a subsidiary that serves solely to serve the parent company. However, directors of wholly-owned subsidiaries should be aware that their role is not superficial and involves significant legal obligations. A subsidiary may be set up for the specific purpose of enabling a parent company to rely on the “corporate veil” to distance itself from potential legal obligations that may arise vis-à-vis a subsidiary. In these circumstances, a parent company will seek to demonstrate that the directors of the subsidiary act independently and on market terms from the parent company. The theory that allows an applicant to enter the corporate veil is that a parent should be held accountable for creating the conditions that caused the violation. A parent/subsidiary structure can be very beneficial. In general, the parent company is not responsible for the shares of the subsidiary.
However, there are exceptions to this rule. The plaintiff would therefore have to prove that the court has personal jurisdiction over the foreign entity before he could join it. To do this, the applicant must either prove that the foreign subsidiary has sufficient minimum contacts with the Forum, as it does with the parent company, or establish the agency or alter-ego relationship. U.S. federal courts are generally reluctant to conclude that there is an alter ego or agency relationship to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant in the absence of facts establishing full oversight. This is a significant obstacle for applicants, which must be overcome as a threshold. In this context, a parent company must carefully consider the degree of control it wishes to exercise over its wholly-owned subsidiary. The framework may contain guidelines and minutes on matters affecting the board of directors and management, including policies on conflict of interest, the composition of the board of directors, and procedures for board meetings.
A comprehensive governance framework for subsidiaries will help train and protect the subsidiary`s senior management and employees in the performance of their respective duties. Crawford requested that the case be dismissed for non-membership in an indispensable party, arguing that Crawford Venezuela was an indispensable party and that Crawford was not responsible for the actions of its subsidiary.19 However, Crawford also argued that Crawford Venezuela could not be reached because the court did not have personal jurisdiction to do so. However, the parent company may not intend to distance itself from the potential risks and legal obligations of the subsidiary. Instead, it may seek to minimize the risk of liabilities related to the subsidiary and its assets by carefully controlling and managing the subsidiary`s activities. Under these conditions, the parent company must be aware that the corporate veil could be “broken”, which means that the parent company itself can be considered a fictitious director with the same obligations and responsibilities as a director of the subsidiary. Neglect of legal obligations and corporate governance at the subsidiary level can expose both the directors of the subsidiary and the entire group of companies to serious risks. It is therefore essential that the directors of a wholly-owned subsidiary conscientiously perform their duties, and the importance of implementing an effective framework for company-wide governance is not overlooked. In most cases, the parent company is not responsible for the actions of the subsidiaries. .